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INTRODUCTION 
Is Kuwait a "small state"? To ask the question is neither a matter of 
seeking paradox nor of provocation. On the contrary, our question is a 
serious one, in the sense that it points directly to the weakness of certain 
socio-political analyses based upon quantifiable variables (population and 
territory) and upon notions of an econometric type (viability, optimal 
size, economies of scale, etc.). The terminological vagueness reveals in 
itself the weakness of these analyses and the inadequacy of certain 
notions and concepts inherited from the nineteenth century in the light 
of new scientific·, technological and socio-political phenomena; thus, one 
speaks of the "micro-State", the "small-State", the "small economy", the 
"small country" ... without the scholar knowing exactly what is being 
referred to and what rigorous indicators he disposes of to determine 
smallness, viability, the size declared to be optimal, etc. 
The study of the Kuwaiti case can contribute to demonstrating the 
imprecision and fragility of these analyses and of the quantifiable 
parameters upon which they are based. In short, to seriously call into 
question the notion of viability itself. 
With a surface area of 17 ,818 km2 and a total population of 1,300,000 
inhabitants (58% of which are foreigners), Kuwait certainly appears to be 
a small Arab State wedged between Iraq to the north, Saudi Arabia to the 
south and the Gulf to the east. Given that its indigenous population does 
not rise above the quasi-magical threshold of one million inhabitants, its 
inhabitable surface does not exceed 50% of the total territory, its 
immediate environment is menacing and marked by three regional 
"giants" (Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran), Kuwait would seem to constitute 
the ideal case study of a "Small State" and fertile ground for an 
interrogation on the notion of viability. Observed in isolation and in a 
mechanistic manner, the two variables population/territory would clearly 
indicate the existence of a small State with its share of 
socio-demographic, economic, political and geopolitical problems. 
However, small demographic size and an exiguous territory are not in 
*or., I.E.U.D., 24 Rue Rothschild 1202, Geneva, Switr:erland. 
114 F Mel/ah 
themselves significant from the point of view of political or even 
economic analysis. One must also take into account such parameters as 
the distribution of the population on the territory (which will be 
important in the analysis of the communication factor in the broad sense 
of the term); the degree of urbanization (which will sometimes bring 
together the study of small States and that of city-States); the 
demographic structures and their projection (which will indicate the 
society's internal dynamism) .. .In short, the study of the small size of a 
State, of a society or of an economy does not solely consist of positivist 
and quantified observation of the traditional variables, but of a 
correlation of these variables. 
Kuwait is thus found not only to be the most heavily populated 
Principality of the Gulf Emirates but also to have the highest density of 
the region (63 inhabitants per km2 on average and 118 inhabitants per 
km2 if one takes into account only the inhabitable surface area). This 
characteristic together with a very high degree of urbanization (80% of 
the population is concentrated in the capital and the country's principal 
ports) indicate a very high degree of communication, which is not 
without incidence upon the political, social and economic organization. 
Indeed, if one considers a socio-economic formation and the State which 
organizes it not only as a juxtaposition of demographic, economic and 
territorial elements, but as a more or less intense network of com-
munications of all sorts, then density - more than extent of territory -
becomes a pertinent variable for the correct evaluation of the socio-
economic viability of a State. Thus, to cite only a few examples: a part 
from their importance in world commerce of the period, the Mercantile 
Republics such as Venice, Florence and Geneva, were able to derive a 
comparative advantage from a degree of internal communication which 
was more intense than that of larger underpopulated territories; today 
Hong Kong and Singapore benefit from the same comparative advantage. 
And this is also the advantage which high density offers the Principality 
of Kuwait which seems, in this way, to be more homogeneous than Saudi 
Arabia or Libya. 
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
The observation of the behavior of the demographic variable and of its 
evolution reveals further characteristics still: from 1957 (207 ,000 inhabi-
tants) to 1977 (1,200,000 inhabitants) Kuwait's total population increased 
fivefold. Of course, immigration weighed heavily in this very rapid 
evolution (from 93,000 non-Kuwaitis in 1957 the figure rises to 590,000 
in 1977); but the indigenous dynamism was exactly proportional to this 
very high rate of growth (114,000 Kuwaitis in 1957 rising to 540,000 in 
1977). In less than one generation Kuwait was able to quintuple its indi-
genous population. The adoption of policies resolutely supporting a high 
birth rate together with the considerable improvement in living and 
health conditions certainly account to a great extent for this internal 
dynamism, aimed at counterbalancing the effects of a high rate of 
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immigration. Even so, this does not entirely explain the real rate of 
growth of Kuwaiti (6.3%) which is higher than that of non-Kuwaitis 
(S.9%). 
Psychological factors probably played a not inconsiderable role in this 
demographic growth. The collective fear of being "overrun" by foreigners 
and the anguish aroused by a fragile position vis-a-vis three powerful 
neighbors certainly gave rise to positive reactions in terms of 
demography. What can be described as a veritable "smallness syndrome' 
acts upon collective consciences and determines the State's choices; the 
political scientist interested in "small States" must take this into account. 
Just as in the case of the territorial variable, the demographic variable 
cannot be considered in isolation; this variable must also be correlated 
with other variables. In the case in question here, it is very likely that the 
psychological and geo-political factors (the "smallness syndrome") exert a 
very great effect upon the high birth rate characteristic of the indigenous 
Kuwaiti population. 
Naturally, these demographic facts determine the structures of the active 
population. Even if the foreign population constitutes 58% of the total 
population, it furnishes as much as 72% of the active population. 
Kuwait's job market is thus largely dependent upon this factor. Three 
elements contribute, however, to holding back its expansion and even 
inversing it: the 1.4% difference between the real rate of growth of 
Kuwaitis and that of non-Kuwaitis will eventually raise the question of 
the replacement of foreign workers by indigenous workers; the effects of 
the patrol boom from which Kuwait benefited in the l 970's and which 
attracted tens of thousands of immigrants are now wearing thin and we 
today observe, if not a marked decrease at least a stabilization of the 
migratory influx into the Gulf countries; and the State's determined 
efforts in the domains of schooling, education and training (free schools, 
the lowest illiteracy rate in the region, 3% of adults with a university 
education) will bring indigenous start to the job market in increasing 
numbers and operational capacities. These three factors combining their 
effects, the Kuwaiti job market will depend less and less on imported 
labour. We are already beginning to observe this tendency. 
In this domain, too, the "smallness syndrome" exerts an effect: we cannot 
consider the active population variable in isolation and without relating it 
to that which determines and organizes it; that is, political, psychological 
and cultural factors ... Once again, smallness cannot be isolated and 
separated from all the other variables. The correct and rigorous 
evaluation of the size of an entity resides in the correlation of the whole 
set of data. In the case of Kuwait, resources (natural, material, 
intellectual and financial) constitute one of the most important sets of 
data which must be considered in the debate on viability. The problem of 
factors of production and of a society's economic organization is thus 
posed. This is the privileged domain of investigation of the economist 
who advances the quantifiable arguments of economies of scale, 
production costs, optimal size, degrees of dependence; in short, 
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everything which generally gives the notion of viability an economistic 
and clearly reductionist content. As if a State, a nation, a society was no 
more than a simple commercial affair which could be judged by the 
criteria of profit, production costs and cost-benefit analysis. As if a State 
was not essentially an historical, cultural and political phenomenon 
before being a market and an economic space. We will come back to this 
question in the second part of this paper. 
THE PETROLEUM ERA 
With regard to Kuwait, the petroleum era certainly disrupted the 
country's social and economic structures. It allowed for a fabulous growth 
in monetary and material resources; in less than ten years the G.D.P. was 
multiplied by six! Still, one must look back to pre-petroleum Kuwait; it 
was not a stretch of desert inhabited by a few nomadic bedouins. On the 
contrary, it was an economy organized around the central activities of 
fishing and commerce, an economy open to the great commercial circuits 
of Europe and Asia, the existence of large ports and a long tradition of 
commerce and febrile maritime activity bear witness to this. Of course, 
the manufacturer of artificial pearls seriously affected one of the 
Principality's resources (diving for pearls was a major activity), but this 
had not deprived Kuwait of all its assets. Pre-petroleum Kuwait was 
already an open economy, founded upon commerce (agriculture is 
insignificant in Kuwait). As early as the eighteenth century, European 
travellers described the town of Kuwait "as an active town, with a 
population of I 0,000 souls, which lives on pearling and commerce and 
possesses 800 boats ... ". The city drew further attention at the end of the 
eighteenth century when commerce and mail between India, 
Constantinople, Baghdad and Aleppo no longer passed through Basra 
(occupied by the Persians) but through the port of Kuwait. Having 
acquired a privileged role in the international exchanges of the period, 
this small and prosperous principality attracted the attention of the 
British; the Germans in turn became interested in Kuwait and proposed 
that it be the terminus of the Baghdad railway line which was to link 
Hamburg, Constantinople, Baghdad, Basra and Kuwait. 
Thus, from being the "small fortress" - which in fact gave it its name 
(Kuwait is the diminutive of kut which means 'fortress') - serving only 
as a warehouse for arms and food, Kuwait was to become a real 
mercantile principality towards the end of the eighteenth century. Today, 
of course, the facts have completely changed. Alas, the pearl trade seems 
to be a thing of the past. The fishing sector is no more than an 
insignificant part of domestic production, constituting only 18% of the 
country's agricultural production, very weak in itself. In providing the 
country with the highest annual per capita income (nearly 18,000 
dollars), petroleum (1,300,000 barrels a day out of a known reserve of 65 
billion barrels) has given the Kuwaiti State the monetary resources to 
enable it to become a Welfare-State even before reaching the phase of 
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industrialization that the Western States underwent. It would be wrong, 
however, to analyze the Kuwaiti case only in terms of a "rentier 
economy". 
Although centered on petrochemicals (nearly 3 billion dollars of invest-
ments), real efforts are being made to achieve industrial diversification 
(worth nearly one billion dollars). A careful analysis of the modes and 
structures of industrialization in Kuwait also reveals the effects of what 
we have called the "smallness syndrome": responding to its dependence on 
foreign labour, Kuwait has opted for prudent industrialization, using 
advanced technology which requires more capital than manpower. And 
even ·if the State remains, despite the dogma of free enterprise, the 
principal industrial investor, there is no doubt that Kuwaiti industry has 
undergone a certain amount of diversification under the direct control of 
the State and by means of indicative plantification. Apart from petro-
chemicals, sea water desalination (Kuwait is the leading world producer) 
and industrial mills represent important sectors. The rest of the industrial 
"fabric" is essentially composed of small firms employing less than ten 
workers; even so, these firms account for 34% of industrial labour. It is 
true that the manufacturing industry only represents 8% of G.D.P., but it 
employs 23% of the total workforce. In order to appreciate the 
importance of these efforts to industrialize, it must be pointed out that in 
four years Kuwait has succeeded in quadrupling the value added to its 
industrial production and in doubling the latter's share of G.D.P. 
The efforts to industrialize and diversify seem to have now reached their 
optimal level because the absorption capacities of the Kuwaiti economy 
and the restricted nature of the market do not permit a continuous 
expansion of the industrial sector; is this even desirable? In fact, Kuwait 
imports the bulk of its consumption requirements. It has one of the 
highest rates of imports per inhabitant in the world. Does this signify the 
dependence and fragility of an economy which is too open? The 
weakness of a "monoculture" economy, 97% dependent on its income 
from petroleum? Most certainly. But we must remember that this is not a 
new situation for Kuwait. Moreover, the financial resources which the 
Principality disposes of today (an annual income of nearly 6 billion 
dollars), a balance of payments which is "chronically" in surplus, the 
control of such strategic materials as petroleum and gas, the protection of 
its citizens by a legislative arsenal which grants them the exclusive rights 
to all import-export trade, and especially the active role played by the 
State, all protect Kuwait from unpredictable or overly violent upheavals. 
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES 
Apart from its Ministries, it is through the Central Bank that the State 
intervenes in the economic process. The Central Bank of Kuwait is the 
primary instrument of regulation of economic and financial activities 
(deflationist measures, control of credit, control of global demand for 
goods and services, supervision of commercial banks and investment 
companies, etc.). This naturally leads us to point out the importance of 
118 F Me/lah 
the tertiary sector in Kuwait's economy. The monetary surplus generated 
by the income from petroleum (the budgeted revenue always largely 
exceeding the budgeted expenses) has allowed for the development of a 
financial and services sector grossly disproportionate to the country's 
size, needs and economic structures. Eight commercial banks, eighteen 
investment companies, four specialized banks and a Development Fund, 
constitute an institutional bastion, controlled by the Central Bank and 
Ministry of Finance, capable of making the Principality into an 
important financial center at the regional and even international level. 
This is not simply a theoretical possibility because the decline of the 
region's financial center, Beirut, has left a void. With its financial capa-
city - and despite the absence of a banking tradition - Kuwait could fill 
this void; this is the project which the country's elites are working on. 
This fabulous development of Kuwait's financial activities carries with it 
a role which has no relationship to the country's size; in fact, through its 
policy of overseas investment and of loans and substantial financial aid to 
other Arab States, the small Gulf Principality, this demographic and 
territorial dwarf, proves to be one of the motors of the integration of the 
other Arab economies into the world market. The Kuwaiti Fund for Arab 
Economic Development, endowed with capital of nearly three billion 
dollars, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, today 
make it possible to channel a substantial part of the Kuwaiti monetary 
surplus and inject this into the poor economies of the region (Egypt, the 
two Yemens, Sudan, Syria, the PLO, etc.). Nearly two billion dollars have 
"transited" in this way through the Kuwaiti Fund and Beneficiary Arab 
States to be, ultimately, reinjected into the Western economies in the 
form of orders for machinery, know-how or development projects. This 
is no small consequence of Kuwait's monetary surplus ... This "small State" 
(according to the classical indicators) today integrates in its wake the 
non-petroleum Arab economies into the world market! 
IS KUWAIT VIABLE? 
This rough and rapidly sketched portrait of Kuwait, these few economic 
and financial facts permit us to now discuss the notion of viability and, 
according to our initial intention, to call this notion seriously into 
question. Is Kuwait viable? An economy which is 97% dependent on the 
export of a single product and its few derivative products, and internal 
job market which is 72% dependent on foreign labour, a process of 
industrialization which is limited on the one hand by a weak capacity of 
absorption and on the other by the restricted nature of the market, an 
immediate environment which is politically and militarily hostile ... given 
these facts the scholar can only respond with certainty: Kuwait is not 
viable. None of the nineteenth century economists would have wagered 
on the future of the Principality. Despite its high annual income, despite 
its monetary surplus, despite its one hundred years' worth of known 
petroleum reserves, Kuwait would have appeared to be non-viable in the 
economic sense of the term and if one mechanically applied the 
traditional indicators. And yet...Kuwait lives, foresees and plans the 
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future, has constituted a Solidarity Fund for future generations, exports, 
imports, industrializes, decides, grows demographically, integrates itself 
and other larger entities than itself into the world market, arbitrates in 
regional conflicts, is a member of the United Nations, the League of 
Arab States and OPEC; its intelligent and liberal press is widely read and 
appreciated, its university is respected, its businessmen are renowned, its 
banks sought after and its political stability envied. Is Kuwait viable? 
When the Principality acquired its independence in 1961, after a long 
British protectorate, this was not questioned by the descendants of the 
Al-Sabbah dynasty, the country's political and intellectual elite and the 
Kuwait people itself. The "little fortress" had acquired since the middle 
of the eighteen century a cultural specificity, a political autonomy and an 
economic role which had already constituted it as a quasi-sovereign 
entity facing the Ottomans, the British and the Saudi Wahhabites. And it 
is, perhaps, the diplomatic and military antagonism between the powers 
of the period which permitted the Principality to establish its sovereignty 
and consolidate its cultural and political specificity. In fact, Kuwait's 
destiny has always been marked (and safeguarded) by this contradictory 
play of regional and international powers in force in the Gulf. Had not 
the Persion occupation of Basra favored, in the eighteenth century, the 
prosperity of the City of Kuwait? Had not the Anglo-Ottoman rivalries, 
in the nineteenth century, permitted the strengthening of the 
Principality's autonomy? And in the twentieth century, did not the 
differences opposing Saudi Arabia and Iran on the one hand and Iraq on 
the other contribute to stabilizing the young State's independence in 
1961? 
Geopolitics has favored the emergence of this "small State". It is one of 
the most important variables which must be taken into account to eval-
uate the viability of "small States". It is, indeed, in the analysis of the 
regional political and diplomatic system, in the geopolitical factors, that 
one finds the historical explanation for so many "small States" 
(Luxemburg, Belgium, Monaco, Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, etc.) In the regional system con-
stituted by the Gulf not only is Kuwait viable but, what's more. it 
appears to be a necessary element of equilibrium between Saudi Arabia, 
Iraq, Iran and the other Arab Principalities. Neither Iran nor Saudi 
Arabia were mistaken in 1961 when they opposed Iraqi pretensions to the 
Principality. Is not this geopolitical factor determinant? Is Kuwait viable? 
ON THE CONCEPT OF VIABILITY 
Going beyond the empirical character which this question often assumes, 
we would now like to make a theoretical breakthrough and inverse the 
question: is the notion of viability, itself, still viable in the social sciences 
and more particularly in political sociology and economics? This notion, 
despite its youth (it dates from the end of the nineteenth century), is 
charged with meaning and representations of an ideological nature. No 
one posed the question of whether the Mercantile Republics of the 
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European Lower Middle Ages were viable or not. No one asks whether 
Luxemburg, Monaco or even Switzerland are viable entities. Hong Kong 
and Singapore have achieved viability through hard work and determined 
organization. Why is the question raised today with reference to the new 
States of the Third World? Why did the League of Nations go as far as 
refusing membership to micro-States? Why is the question regularly 
posed at the UN whether it is "logical" and "acceptable" that Malta should 
have the same vote as the U.S.A. and Bahrain the same presence at the 
General Assembly as the U .S.S.R.? 
Without entering into the debate on the political and ideological ulterior 
motives which underlie the question of viability, we should like to 
propose a critique of the paradigm which was founded the vision of 
States, nations and markets since the end of the nineteenth century. 
Because this is what is at the heart of the problem: the political and 
economic model bequethed to us by nineteenth century Europe, the 
industrial century founded upon the rise of capitalism and the mecha-
nistic vision of organizational phenomena. 
The question of viability was not posed by the mercantilist conception of 
the prosperity of States. In this conception, wealth depended upon a 
community's commercial insertion and its capacity to accumulate material 
wealth (silver, gold, etc.). According to this model, Kuwait would be 
viable. However, with the development of the classical economic theory 
the paradigm was to change. The wealth of nations was to depend 
thereafter upon the capacity to mobilize the factors of production, capital 
and labour. Industry (in the widest sense of the term) was thus to 
supplant the other sources of wealth. In this paradigm - which borrows 
from the mechanistic vision founded upon the notions of power, force, 
equilibrium - the demographic variable is determinant because, naturally, 
it conditions the size of the available work force, the quantity of demand 
for goods and services, and even the major periods of economic 
equilibrium. It is this paradigm, which we will call the paradigm of 
mechanistic and industrialist mobilization, that determined the form of 
the modern European States, which all built them into empires; the form 
of their armies, founded upon the general mobilization of their 
populations; the form of their schools, founded upon the process of 
"massification"; the form of their markets, etc. It is this paradigm which 
determined even the form of the capitalist industries which all constitute 
large enterprises favoring the optimal conjunction of capital and labour; 
which determined the notions of profit, rationality, economies of scale, 
etc. It is this paradigm which still haunts us, inhabits us all: because we 
are all "classicals" in this respect (including the Marxists among us). 
This socio-economic rationality is new. It is recent in the history of 
humanity. It is not at all universal but particular because it is tied to a 
particular mode of production. One does not find its traces in the Middle 
Ages or even in the European Renaissance. It is of capitalist essence. It is 
founded upon the paradigm of mechanistic and industrialist mobilization. 
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And it is with reference to the indicators issued forth from this paradigm 
that we continue to judge the ·viability of States. 
But faced with the emergence of new factors and under the pressure of 
the technological, scientific and ideological mutations that we have 
experienced since the end of the Second World War, this mechanistic 
paradigm proves to be less and less able to explain the new realities. No 
one can still believe today that a society, an economy, a State or even an 
enterprise constitutes no more than a mechanical juxtaposition of forces 
and equilibriums. The flows and networks of energy and information are 
today becoming the fundamental parameters of social, political and 
economic organization. The new types of industries, the new types of 
arms, the new modes of management all demonstrate to a greater and 
greater extent the need for networks of communication (in the widest 
sense of the term). From now on, it is with reference to communication 
that political and economic analysis will be undertaken. This relegates 
our old notions of optimal size, economies of scale and so forth to the 
museum of historical notions! 
A NEW MODEL 
We are faced with a new model, which we will call the communicational 
model; it will replace the old mechanistic model. A new paradigm is 
necessary; it will not be of an economistic nature but cultural and 
political. It will not be founded upon the concepts of equilibrium and 
equivalence but upon the concepts of information and communication. 
New concepts are indispensable; they will not be founded upon the 
classical variabl.es (territory, population, power ... ) but upon variables 
such as energy and organization. 
In this new paradigm, it would seem obvious that small entities will 
dispose of a comparative advantage resulting from the greater 
communication that characterizes them. In this sense, a small or medium 
enterprise will be more viable than a giant enterprise, Kuwait will be 
more viable than Saudi Arabia, Malta more viable than Italy and 
Singapore more advantaged than China. 
And then the economist of the end of the twentieth century will ask the 
question: are large States, giant enterprises, large economies still viable? 
